The World Bank is a prestigious and large international financial institution. Since its foundation it has widened the scope and the size of its activities. One interpretation of what the World Bank is doing is the provision of public goods. If we take this interpretation seriously the comprehensiveness of the Bank's activity suggests that the Bank is assuming more and more the functions of a world government in the making. An alternative interpretation would look at the World Bank as a huge bureaucratic organization, acting on its own behalf. This interpretation can not be endorsed fully by the available information, but only in the sense of bureau-shaping. The Bank itself is proud of being a knowledge bank. But its actual activity is the popularization of ideas on development and not the application of research outcomes in its day-to-day operations. The most appropriate interpretation of the activity of the World Bank is that its changing scope and size is shaped heavily by pressure from different interest groups.
Introduction
The World Bank is a prestigious and large international financial institution. The purposes of the World Bank are defined in the Articles of the Agreement. The normal assumption would be that the purposes of an institution can explain its actual activities.
In the case of the World Bank we would expect that it lends the money it has raised on the world capital markets to its clients for the purposes of reconstruction and development. In this paper we will try to find out how far the World Bank meets these expectations.
Therefore, first of all we examine if there have been changes in the definition of the purpose and the kind of activity of the World Bank. If this is the case the question arises how to explain the size and the changing structure of the World Bank activity. We discuss four different theoretical approaches and examine in each case how far they help in understanding how the activities of the World Bank are shaped. The first approach is that of providing public goods discussed in part 2. In part 3 we draw upon the theory of bureaucracy for the same purpose. How far the activities of the World Bank can be explained by the assumption that it is a knowledge bank is discussed in part 4. Part 5 is devoted to the discussion of the theory of interest groups and its value in understanding the activities of the World Bank. In part 6 the question is raised if the Bank is still necessary. The conclusions are summarized in part 7.
Purpose and the Changing Activity of the World Bank
Article 1 of the Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development specifies five purposes. These purposes are not tuned with each other in a coherent manner. The most familiar purpose is reconstruction and development, given in the first subsection. The other four purposes are mentioned less frequently in public and usually not discussed in the context of the activity of the World Bank. In several annual reports of the World Bank before 1989 the common objective of the World Bank group is mentioned to be "to help raise the standards of living in developing countries by channeling financial resources from developed countries to the developing world".
But in the annual report of 1989 the central goal of the World Bank is given simply as "the reduction of poverty" (p. 38). Poverty reduction becomes from now on the most known short-cut for the objective of the World Bank. It is not easy to see if this small differentiation in defining the objectives of the World Bank makes a difference. That this can be the case is shown by the fact that in the 1970s a discussion started about the possible existence of a trade-off between the goals of output growth and equity for poor countries. McNamara, the then-President of the World Bank denied this (Kapur et al 1997, p. 16) . But in terms of policy formulation the two different paraphrases of the goals may lead to diverse concepts with different implications for the development process. This can be observed looking at the changing activity of the World Bank since its foundation in 1944.
Initially the Bank concentrated on European recovery, not on the development of underdeveloped areas (Kapur and Webb 1996, p. 348) . But its role in the reconstruction of Europe was minimal and soon the Bank began to reassess it, focussing on lending for development. The Bank began to borrow on the developed country capital markets and to re-lend for specific development projects (Toye 2003, p. 365) , mainly in the fields of large-scale power and transport. Lending for agriculture was minor and for social sectors practically non-existent. Kapur and Webb (1996, p. 350) mention that this loan policy was considered to constitute a sound development strategy. Infrastructure investments were seen as an engine for growth, producing more private investments.
Agriculture was seen as necessary but development was mostly identified with industrialization. Social sector expenditures (water, education and health) were avoided due to their high opportunity cost. It was in the 1970s that sectoral concerns (energy, agriculture, social sectors) won high priority. At the same time a poverty-oriented strategy was developed. McNamara, from the beginning of his Presidency in 1968, stressed the elements of a new approach to development: "the basic human needs". A greater share of the enlarged resources of the World Bank was, from now on, devoted to this new direction. He saw no trade-off between growth and poverty reduction. So Growth and Development, mentioned in Article 1 as the purpose of the World Bank, now became the indirect result of poverty orientation of the World Bank's activity.
At the end of the 1970s the serious problem of indebtedness of many developing countries arose following the two oil price shocks. This led to the rise of policy-based lending. This shift towards adjustment lending was based on conditionality. Funds would be released only as specific policies were implemented. The goal of adjustment lending was not poverty reduction, but to restore sustained economic growth. This led to a minor emphasis on poverty reduction during the first half of the 1980s. During the second half, poverty reduction once again became the central focus of the Bank's policy. Even adjustment lending was developed into a more poverty oriented strategy.
Adjustment lending had now the additional goal to protect the poor against adjustment shocks and to focus on the quality of life for the poor (Kapur et al. 1997, p. 29) .
Today the specific focus of the World Bank is on poverty reduction. The vast activity of the World Bank in diverse areas is based on this interpretation of the main goal of the institution. Box 1 gives the major topic areas in which the World Bank is engaged.
Looking at Article 1 of the Agreement and considering the differentiation in the definition of the goals of the World Bank since 1944 with its implication for the nature of its activity, one feels a great uncertainty about the true mission of the Bank and what has been the real object of its founders. Initially the World Bank was seen as a "development fund that would provide finance for clearly identified projects that would assist development" (Hughes 1999, p. 200) . The lending concept was comparable to a commercial enterprise, financing projects proposed by its clients (Oliver 1996, p. 255) .
But the Bank soon came to the conclusion that the borrowing countries lacked the technical expertise needed to prepare project application. It was also recognized that the soundness of projects ultimately rested on the overall quality of policy-making of the borrowing countries (Gavin and Rodrik 1995, p. 332) .
Beyond lending activities the Bank entered therefore the realm of economic policy making. Sectoral and national economic reviews prepared by survey missions were introduced to investigate the over-all economic position of the borrowing country and probable investment resources. The World Bank also began to contribute to project appraisal and implementation (Hughes 1999, p. 201) . As early as the end of the 1950s the Bank advised its clients to call in consultants to make the necessary preparations for a successful project and to look for organizations or individuals qualified to assist in running and implementing the project (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1957, pp. 44-45) . Today, far from it, the World Bank does not only dominate the whole project cycle but also, together with the IMF, the economic policy making in developing countries (for a description of the project cycle see box 3).
Box 3: Project Cycle

Country Assistance Strategy
The Bank prepares lending and advisory services, based on the selectivity framework and areas of comparative advantage, targeted to country poverty reduction efforts.
Identification
Projects are identified that support strategies and that are financially, economically, socially, and environmentally sound. Development Strategies are analyzed.
Preparation
The Bank provides policy and project advice along with financial assistance.
Clients conduct studies and prepare final project documentation.
Appraisal
The Bank assesses the economic, technical, institutional, financial, environmental, and social aspects of the project. The project appraisal document and draft legal documents are prepared.
Negotiations and Board Approval
The Bank and borrower agree on loan or credit agreement and the project is presented to the Board for approval.
Implementation and Supervision
The borrower implements the project. The Bank ensures that the loan proceeds are used for the loan purposes with due regard for economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.
Implementation and Completion
The Implementation Completion Report is prepared to evaluate the performance of both the Bank and the borrower.
Evaluation
The Bank's independent Operations Evaluation Department prepares an audit report and evaluates the project. Analysis is used for future projects.
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The World Bank as a Provider of International Public Goods
Not only have there been changes in the definition of the purposes of the World Bank, but also in the size and structure of its activities. One interpretation of the changing activity of the World Bank could be its character as an international institution, providing international public goods. Initially, the rational explanation for the creation of the Bank was the imperfection of international capital markets. "Special risks", which the private lenders would not be ready to accept, were mentioned as the reason for the necessity of collective action to overcome this deficiency. Gavin and Rodrik (1995, p. 331) believe that "war and depressions clearly affect the returns on investment of all kinds, but it is far from obvious that they drive a wedge between private and public returns". If this was true private markets would have thrived soon after the war, so that there would not have been any argument for the creation of a World Bank. They mention further that it is " a little schizophrenic about an agency that preempts potential private lenders because they are allegedly too risk-averse, then demands that its loans be senior to any others, thereby shifting most of the risk onto private investors in unrelated projects, whose loans have thereby been subordinated." The argument of the imperfection of the international capital markets soon after the war would imply that the World Bank is only a temporary institution, the need for which would disappear as soon as the capital markets became more perfect (Gavin and Rodrik, p. 331-33).
The creation of the Bank is defended sometimes on the ground that there exists a "policy risk" making it necessary to have an impact on economic policy in developing countries (Gavin and Rodrik, p. 331) . This is a justification for lending conditionality.
But in this case also the same arguments apply. Private agencies could consult the developing countries on every aspect of economic policy making in a more appropriate way than the World Bank is presently doing. In the same manner it applies also that this function would have been temporary due to the learning capacity of developing countries.
In the literature the provision of public goods by the World Bank is not confined to overcoming the imperfection of the international capital markets and the policy intervening in the borrowing countries. Other public goods allegedly provided by the World Bank include (Stiglitz 1998 , Gilbert et al. 2000 :
Strengthening the democratic processes, promoting partnership with the private sector, providing knowledge about and relevant to development, global environment, correcting market failures, rectification of information failures, elimination of drug trafficking, management of global capital flows.
It is clear that a World Bank providing all these "public" goods would be a huge international organization, assuming roles that otherwise would be taken over by a world government. The question arises also, if private agencies could not provide such public goods. But it looks as if it is taken for granted that the World Bank is the appropriate organization to take on the provision of all kinds of public goods in the absence of a world government. It is surely a risky undertaking for the planet as a whole to transfer far-ranging responsibilities to an organization which was created for the simple job of canalization of capital to underdeveloped areas for development purposes, without any intention to reconfigure it to other directions. Such an organization will develop into an all-governing body while no conscious idea or deliberation would exist on the necessity and nature of such a world government in the making.
The World Bank as a Bureaucracy
Another interpretation of the World Bank activity is its character as a bureau, acting on its own behalf. "Bureaucrats are officials working permanently for large organizations in circumstances where their own contribution to organizational effectiveness cannot be directly evaluated" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 148) . They are rational utility maximizers. There are two different interpretations of their maximization behavior. The basic approach is that officials maximize the size of the agency, which is assessed, as some writers suggest, primarily in terms of personnel. Another interpretation is that the agency's budget is the central focus for top officials. Larger budgets help bureaucrats push up salaries and fringe benefits, improve officials' promotion prospects and more easily divert resources into creating prestigious offices and more beautiful secretariats (Dunleavy 1991, p. 154-155) . Vaubel (1996) has analyzed the World Bank empirically as a bureaucratic organization.
He writes that "international organizations are farther removed from democratic control than national government bureaucracies, and since their staff is recruited from highly diverse backgrounds, there is little else they can agree on but to pursue their common bureaucratic interest" (Vaubel 1996, p. 195) . In his approach bureaucracies try to maximize their budget, their staff and their independence. In his empirical analysis he finds out that the growth of the staff of the World Bank has exceeded the growth of the staff in comparable institutions and that the labor productivity at the World Bank has declined since the 1950s and increasingly so since the 1970s (Vaubel 1996, p. 209) .
This means that the World Bank has suffered from bureaucratic deficiencies. But there are some weaknesses in the methodological approach of Vaubel (1996) . First, calculating the productivity, the proxy for output, i.e. the number of credits approved during the financial year, is imperfect as he himself concedes (p. 196) . It captures neither the quality of design of such credits nor of supplementary services. Taking this into account an annual increase of the ratio of staff to new credits of 0.4 percent can hardly be an indicator for declining productivity. Secondly, the adequacy of the growth of staff can only be judged relative to the task the respective organizations are asked to perform (Willet 2001, p. 329) . Vaubel neglects this fact. His finding on the other side that the staff size in the World Bank is responsive to real labor cost (Vaubel 1996, p. 202) requires an explanation why this might be the case in a bureaucratized organization. Should this, however, not be the case it would contradict his bureaucratization thesis.
We present below some data which do not approve the thesis of bureaucratization of the World Bank as far as it is measured in terms of growing personnel or increasing administrative costs. As table 1 shows, the amount of loans approved by the World Bank and their disbursements have decreased recently in absolute terms. Table 2 shows that considering the growth rates, this has been the case since the mid-seventies. The highest growth rates are recorded for the 1960s until the mid-1970s. The same trend but with some outliner values is registered in the case of professional staff and administrative costs. This may also apply to the staff as a whole, presently around 10.000 persons.
This pattern can not be interpreted as an affirmation of the thesis of bureaucratization.
There was a strong tendency towards bureaucratization at the beginning but this tendency became weaker in recent years. It may be that now a stalemate is reached and that the World Bank is neither continuing to grow nor is there any tendency towards shrinkage. Dunleavy (1991) suggests another approach to the study of bureaucracy. For him the "characteristics of public service employment systems make it likely that the welfare of higher ranking bureaucrats is closely bound up with the intrinsic characteristics of their work rather than near-pecuniary utilities" (p. 209). Therefore bureau-shaping activities are the more adequate expression for the behavior of rational bureaucrats. Such activities are "designed to bring their agency into line with an ideal configuration conferring high status and agreeable work tasks, within a budgetary constraint" (p. 209).
Bureaus cut down on routine workloads while maximizing the agency's policy control, they try to minimize its dependence upon external organizations, and export troublesome and costly low-grade tasks to rivals or to separated agencies (Dunleavy (1991, pp. 204-205) . Seen from this perspective, in managing its loan portfolio and by advising developing countries (structural reform policies) and organizing costly trips for its staff around the planet for this purpose the World Bank looks to be a true bureaushaping organization. This was especially true under Robert McNamara (1968 McNamara ( -1981 .
The international reputation, the intellectual leadership and the financial clout of the bank were established during his term as president of the bank. He especially tried to maintain his independence and that of his institution from pressures from all sides (Clark 1981, pp. 178-182) . But even today this bureau-shaping attitude can be felt clearly when contacting the different World Bank departments.
New Images: The World Bank as a Knowledge Bank
In 1996, the World Bank made a commitment to become a global knowledge bank. This might be another explanation for a series of activities of the World Bank during the last decade. To produce knowledge is of course not the goal of a bank. But the new image of the World Bank is just to do this, i. e. producing knowledge about development and disseminating it to the developing countries. This is justified with the character of knowledge as an international public good. Since no single country or private organization has the incentive to undertake the research necessary to create such knowledge, international institutions have to fill the gap (Squire 2000, p. 108-109) . This is a curious argument due to the fact that many research institutes and organizations exist all over the world, producing exactly the kind of knowledge the World Bank is producing. Knowledge is non-rival but at least partially excludable and can therefore be produced and supplied privately. For the "knowledge that the developing world needs" (Squire 2000, p. 109) to be produced it is not therefore necessary that an international institution should solve "the difficult problem of coordinating the action of many countries" (Squire 2000, p. 109).
The necessity of in-house production of research is substantiated also by the argument that "it is difficult to structure incentives such that outside research institutes will deliver the kind of research the World Bank seeks to promote" (Squire 2000, p. 109). Apart from the fact that the kind of research which is produced in the World Bank is supplied by many institutions, nongratuitous research based on terms of reference is a very common way of producing knowledge and it is not clear why the World Bank should not be able to produce the knowledge it seeks using this approach. Gilbert et al. (2000, p. 50-51) believe that outside suppliers are not able to carry the requisite overhead costs.
He compares the cost-minimizing pressures of such suppliers with the freedom of the World Bank from such pressures due to its income on capital. But having no income constraint is a problem as far as it affects the quality of research negatively. In order not to waste resources, in case there is no income constraint, the production of knowledge should be outsourced.
As a primary rationale for an in-house research capacity at the World Bank Squire This leadership does not necessarily follow from the excellence of its research but it looks rather to be based on its large research capacity relegating all its competitors to the role of repetitors and admirers. It could even be the case that the research activity of the World Bank hinders the development of private research capacity in development elsewhere and especially in developing countries. These countries get the ideas delivered, so that any incentive to develop ideas and be curious about their own developing possibilities would be destroyed.
Where the World Bank could in fact serve the research community in an outstanding way is to redirect its available resources to and concentrate especially on the development and supply of comparative international data sets on development. This is the area where the real comparative advantage of an international institution like the World Bank lies, and where any other private organization or university will be hardly able to realize comparative standards. But it is not a virtue to use such data sets developed by the bank to test theories developed and propagated by the bank itself. This would lead easily into the temptation to manipulate data in order to find such theories empirically verified.
The World Bank and Interest Groups
Another (Kapur et al. 1997, p. 10) . Meyer resisted and resigned. McCloy, the next president managed to reach an agreement with the Board, making it a reactive body while the management would be in charge of all lending proposals and other operational initiatives (Kapur et al. 1997, p. 10 ).
This was the first time the World Bank stood up to defend its autonomy. The most influential president of the World Bank in this respect was Robert McNamara (1968 McNamara ( -1981 . Against the bank's rich shareholders he pressed aggressively the needs of the bank's underprivileged clients, while at the same time being quite careful to insulate himself from both recipient and donor politics (Kapur et al. 1997, p. 21) . But this was not always successful. In the 1970s there has been constant pressure from the U.S.
treasury and the congress to modify the bank's policy, which could not be resisted entirely. The Congress opposed especially the limited flow of information from the bank and the inadequacy of audit and evaluation systems. The bank was also pressed to keep salaries and benefits at levels comparable to those paid by private employers and the U.S. government.
The lending policy of the bank was also under attack (Gwin 1997, pp. 221-223) The bank came under attack for supporting regimes violating human rights and for not doing enough to aid the poor (Gwin 1997, pp. 211-212) . Therefore liberal and conservative development groups in the U.S. had a decisive impact on the formulation of a pro-poor policy in the World Bank via Congress.
Another group with an impact on the lending policy of the World Bank is that of international commercial banks. (Henning 1996, p. 180) . "Indeed, the Baker effect was to transfer major fractions of the commercial bank debt to the multilateral institutions" (Kapur et al. 1997, p. 31) .
At the beginning of the 1980s, numerous other pressure groups entered the stage. The first-world nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) took on the bank as an adversary and pressed for a broadening of the policy agenda of the bank. The bank was under constant pressure to give these groups a say regarding the development of its policies. It was argued that the people and communities most affected by the bank's policy were badly represented by their own governments on the board. The institution was therefore in need of "democratization", so as to better represent and be accountable to those it affects. The only way in which these people's voice and concerns about bank projects Bank. The World Bank has also established numerous funding mechanisms to provide grants to CSOs. It also has training programs available to CSO staff.
Our discussion in this section is summarized in table 3. According to this interpretation the activity of the World Bank anytime is the result of the pressure caused by different interest groups, which are in action at the time and the ability of the management to transform this pressure into operational directives. The outcome is not rational in the sense that goals are realized with given means. It is determined in a process of reaction, fending off, resisting, maneuvering and deciding. In this case any statement regarding the issue if the policy of the Bank is successful or not could itself easily become a subject matter to interest groups and hardly be settled by rigorous scientific analysis.
Is the Bank Still Necessary?
At the time of the creation of the World Bank there was a clear understanding that its role was the overcoming of the imperfections of the world capital markets. The Bank's second president John J. McCloy thought therefore that "the Bank was a temporary institution, the need for which would disappear as international capital markets became more nearly perfect" (Gavin and Rodrik, 1995, pp. 331-332) . Today, the international capital markets are highly developed but the World Bank is far from being redundant. It has not only opened up new areas of activity in more advanced developing countries but has also become indispensable in poor developing countries. By refocusing its lending function and incorporating many new issues it is in a position to recommend its money and advice to every developing country in whatever situation. By this, it is demonstrating clearly that institutions, once created, develop their own life, eager to live and to expand and hopefully able to handle any external pressure they are exposed to.
Another development route would be opened if the Bank had to stick to its original role of being a bank. A bank lends money to a customer, who can present a sound project to be financed. It does not attach to the money it lends ideas and advice how to run the firm. In the case of the World Bank, in its early days the same procedure was applied.
The institution was dominated by bankers (Gavin and Rodrik, p. 332). The soundness of a project presented by a sovereign customer depends of course on the overall quality of policy making. According to Gavin and Rodrik (1995, p. 332) In the case of a commercial bank the soundness of a project depends also on the overall policy of the firm. The bank evaluates the overall policy of the firm but it does not prescribe policy instructions in detail to be followed by the firm. If the policy environment is not appropriate, the loan is denied or postponed as long as the firm has not changed its policies. In case of the World Bank it could be argued that a policy of conditionality is necessary because the borrowing countries lack the technical expertise to formulate and implement an appropriate policy. This argument might have been valid in the early days of the Bank. Today, in many cases the borrowers themselves are in a position to suggest policy reforms and if not, they may use the services of private firms and economic consultancies specialized on this kind of advice. In the case of the World Bank it is not clear why both functions i. e. comprehensive advice on practically all aspects of policy reforms and lending should be combined in one hand.
To return to its original function as a bank, therefore, the World Bank would have to concentrate on project appraisal, lending and monitoring the agreement continuously to ensure that the terms are followed and that all required payments are being made.
Project preparation on the other hand, including preparing documents on the state of the current policies and the formulation of the required policy reforms, would be incumbent on the borrower, who can also use the services of specialized agencies. This division of responsibilities would have advantages for both, the Bank and the borrower. For the borrower the greatest advantage would be that of true ownership. The borrower has to formulate his own policy reforms and discuss them with the Bank. He is not confronted with an array of reforms he has to accept as a conditionality attached to the loan but he himself suggests reforms, he would be ready to implement if the loan was granted. The
Bank has also an impact on policy reforms while discussing the reforms suggested by the borrower. But it will be not the instance, felt as the one imposing reforms on the borrower.
Preparing and suggesting the required reforms on his own would also have an immense learning impact on the borrower. In order to get the loan the less developed borrower would have an incentive to learn about the pressing economic problems he wishes to overcome, the required reforms and how to present these reforms to the Bank attached to the Loan application. In discussion with the bank the borrower has to define his position. In this case the reforms are not imposed but agreed upon in a process of mutual understanding. For the borrower the process would be one of exercising oneself in policy formulation and policy making. Loans may be denied. But in this case the borrower has to learn to present a better reform project capable of being accepted.
There are also advantages for the Bank. First, the Bank will become more manageable and smaller. Second, much of the critique confronting the bank will recede and more important, the Bank will be much less subject to pressure groups.
Conclusions
The World Bank not only has widened the scope of its activity since its foundation but also its size. Today it is present practically in every corner of the planet with a multitude of diverse projects. It is not any more simply a bank lending money and earning interest, but an institution with a real impact on the economic policies of many developing countries. One interpretation of the World Bank's activities is the provision of public goods. If we take this interpretation seriously the comprehensiveness of the Bank's activity suggests that the Bank is assuming more and more the functions of a world government in the making. An alternative interpretation would look at the World Bank as a huge bureaucratic organization, acting on its own behalf. This interpretation can not be endorsed fully by the available information but only in the sense of bureau-shaping.
The Bank itself is proud of being a knowledge bank. But what the World Bank is really doing is popularization of ideas on development and not yet the application of research outcomes in its day-to-day operations. The most appropriate interpretation of the activity of the World Bank is that its changing scope and size is shaped heavily by pressure from different interest groups. It is struggling for autonomy but permanently subject to demands from diverse groups to change the nature and magnitude of its operations. It has to give way to these demands and in so doing the outcomes are shaped by compromise and not by rational action in the sense that goals are realized with given means.
The World Bank might have been better advised to return to its original plans of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s to confine its activity to the appraisal and approval of projects which are proposed by its clients. The other parts of the project cycle would be the business of the developing country and the consultants and private firms hired by the country. This is also true looking at the World Bank as an agency advising its clients to implement economic reforms. The World Bank could limit its activity to the appraisal of reform programs. The literal formulation and preparation of the reform program would then be the business of the developing country suggesting it for financing.
